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The problem of personal identity can be expressed as follows: what makes 
a self existing at one time the same self as someone existing at a later time? 
Proponents of phenomenal continuity accounts claim that the answer lies in the 
continuation of phenomenal states over time: self A survives as self B if and only 
if A’s phenomenal states are continuous with B’s phenomenal states. In this paper, 
I will discuss one such phenomenal continuity account which is expounded by 
Barry Dainton.  
In assessing the viability of a philosophical account, it is useful to see how 
the account deals with some of the problems that plague the field in general. 
Personal fission is a well-known issue that philosophers of personal identity have 
been grappling with since the days of John Locke. My goal in this paper is to 
show that despite what Dainton claims, his account is not compatible with the 
possibility of fission. Following which, I will argue that the incompatibility may 
in fact work to his advantage, since personal fission is absurd for a number of 
reasons. Indeed, given the absurdity of personal fission, we ought to prefer 
Dainton’s account over other accounts of personal identity which are compatible 
with the possibility of personal fission. 





What are the criteria for a person, or a self, to persist or survive over 
time?1 Various answers can be given to this question. One might think that a 
person persists over time if she retains the same physical body over time. 
Alternatively, one might think that persistence is ensured if the person’s current 
psychological or phenomenal properties are connected in an appropriate manner 
to some later psychological or phenomenal properties. In this paper, I examine 
one recent attempt to provide such a set of criteria for personal persistence over 
time: Barry Dainton’s Simple Conception account, a personal identity account 
which claims that phenomenal continuity is essential to personal persistence.2 
The word “person” carries with it much conceptual baggage; in different 
contexts, it could have social, moral and even legal implications. What we are 
interested here in the personal identity debate however, can be abstracted away 
from such implications. We are not interested here in knowing if we are the same 
as an earlier person in the sense that we are legally or morally responsible for 
what she did, even though these are interesting and important issues in themselves. 
What we want to know is whether we will continue to exist in the future, 
regardless of whatever practical implications this existence (or non-existence) 
may have. I differentiate the two issues in this paper by opting for the terms “self” 
                                               
1 In this paper, I will take “persistence” to mean the same thing as “survival”. The two terms, and 
their cognates, will be used interchangeably. 
2 Dainton 2006; Dainton and Bayne 2005. 
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or “subject” (used interchangeably), both of which are intended to be used in the 
same way as “person” but free of any social, moral or legal implications of the 
existence of a person in the future. I assume that this can be done. (Some authors 
will disagree—they argue that the concept of “person” is necessarily tied to its 
social or moral implications (c.f. Greenwood 1994, Chapters 6, 7). I shall ignore 
that debate here.) 
Before we can specify the criteria for personal persistence, we need to 
know what kind of beings selves essentially are. It can be said that we, as selves, 
are living things; that we are things with a certain biological structure; that we are 
moral or social beings; that we are thinking beings; or that we are beings that are 
able to have experiences. The answer that we give to this second question 
influences to a large extent the answer we can give to the first. If I am essentially 
a being that can have thoughts, then it is natural to think that one of the criteria for 
me to persist over time is the continuation of the ability to have thoughts. Or to 
put it differently, if I can persist over time even though I lose the ability to have 
thoughts, then it seems that I am not essentially a being that can have thoughts.  
Barry Dainton thinks that selves are essentially beings that can have 
experiences. According to him, one of the criteria for selves to persist over time is 
continuing to be able to have experiences. (I will discuss at the end of Chapter 2 
why he thinks that the ability to have experience is essential to personal 
persistence.) Continuing to be able to have experiences is necessary for a self to 
persist over time, however, it is not sufficient on its own; for a self to persist over 
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time, she must be able to have experiences which are related in an appropriate 
manner to the experiences of a later self.  
The first part of this paper is devoted to understanding what it means, 
according to Dainton, for experiences to be related to each other “in an 
appropriate manner.” I will do so by examining Dainton’s account in relation to 
the possibility of personal fission (or fission for short), where fission is defined as 
the process in which a self is split into two distinct selves at the same time.3 Thus 
we say that a self has undergone fission if she persists or survives as two or more 
selves at the same time. My aim in this paper is to argue that Dainton’s account is 
incompatible with the possibility of fission. Thus, if it turns out that fission is 
possible, then we have a good reason to think that Dainton’s account is wrong. On 
the other hand, if fission is implausible, then we have a prima facie reason to 
favor Dainton’s account over other accounts of personal identity which are 
compatible with the possibility of fission. 
My secondary aim, which I will take up in the later chapters, is to argue 
that fission is implausible. In doing so, I suggest that Dainton’s account is 
preferable to other personal identity accounts which are compatible with the 
possibility of fission. However, the argument that Dainton’s account is 
incompatible with the possibility of fission is separate and distinct from the 
argument against the possibility of fission. Hence, when discussing the first 
                                               
3 David Lewis set up the problem of fission in terms of the formal character of identity and 
survival in his paper “Survival and identity”. Parfit refers to the case of a man who divides like an 
amoeba in his paper “Personal identity” in The Philosophical Review (Vol. 80, No.1 p.3-27). 
Others who have discussed the problem of fission include David Wiggins in Identity and Spatio-
temporal Continuity (Oxford, 1967, p.50), Sydney Shoemaker in “Persons and their Pasts” in 
American Philosophical Quarterly (Vol. 7, 4, 1970 p.282), and in Self-knowledge and Self Identity 
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1963, p.22). 
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argument, I will remain neutral on whether it is good for an account to be 
compatible with fission.  
We should understand why it seems that fission is possible in the first 
place. We can imagine the following scenario4:  a man’s brain is divided and each 
half of the brain is transplanted into a different body. After the surgery, each body 
(with its respective half of the brain) is able to report on its experiences before 
and after the surgery, and even during the surgery itself. Both of them give the 
same story. There seem to be three possibilities with regards to the survival of the 
original self: 
(1) The self does not survive. 
(2) The self survives as just one of the two selves. 
(3) The self survives as both selves.  
Derek Parfit argues that since a self can likely survive half of his brain 
being removed, it seem unreasonable to think that he cannot survive when both 
halves of the brain are successfully transplanted.5 Thus option (1) is ruled out. 
Similarly, he argues that option (2) is ruled out since it is arbitrary to claim that 
the self survives as only one of the two people, if he survives at all. Thus there is 
only option (3) left. According to Parfit, accounts of personal identity have to be 
open to the possibility of fission—a self can survive as two or more selves who 
exist at the same time. 
The particular account of personal identity that Parfit endorses is a 
psychological continuity account; according to such accounts, a self survives as a 
                                               
4 This is adapted from Parfit’s “Personal identity”. 
5 Parfit frames his discussion in terms of “persons” instead of “selves”, but the crux of the issue is 
not affected. (Parfit 1971, p.4)  
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later self if and only if his psychological states are causally connected in an 
appropriate manner to the psychological states of the later self. Since causal 
relationships can be one-to-many, it is possible for a self to have psychological 
states that are causally connected to the psychological states of more than one self 
at the same time. Hence the fission scenario just described is possible, according 
to psychological continuity accounts, if the two later selves have psychological 
states (like memories and character) which are causally connected to the 
psychological states of the original self in an appropriate manner.  
It is a different matter for Dainton’s version of the phenomenal continuity 
account: I will argue that if Dainton’s version of the phenomenal continuity 
account is correct, then fission is not possible. If personal persistence is defined in 
terms of phenomenal continuity, then it is impossible for a self to be 
phenomenally connected to two later selves existing at the same time, i.e. option 
(3) is not possible. Explicating why it is impossible for a self to be phenomenally 
connected to two or more later simultaneous selves will be the focus of Chapter 4.  
In chapter 2, I will discuss Dainton’s phenomenal continuity account—the 
Simple Conception account. At the same time, I will discuss one of the problems 
that plague Dainton’s account. Since his account defines personal persistence in 
terms of the relationship between experiences, it needs to account for how a self 
can persist through periods of experience-free states. This is known as the 
“bridging problem.” Tackling the bridging problem is necessary since the 
possibility of selves persisting through periods of experience-free states may bear 
on the question of whether Dainton’s account is compatible with personal fission. 
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In chapter 3, I examine the various ways a self can be thought to undergo 
fission. Here, I will argue that there is only one coherent way of construing fission: 
a self undergoes fission if and only if he survives as two numerically distinct 
selves.  
In chapter 4, I will examine some features of Dainton’s account that are 
incompatible with the possibility of fission. The first feature is phenomenal 
holism. Dainton claims that there is some form of holism which holds between 
earlier and later experiences. This phenomenal holism, I will argue, prevents 
selves from undergoing fission. The second feature is the nature of co-
consciousness: given how Dainton characterizes co-consciousness, it is again 
impossible for selves to undergo fission. 
In chapter 5, I will discuss whether we can make sense of personal fission 
from a first person perspective. I argue here that we cannot in fact conceive of 
personal fission, and that this cast doubts on the possibility of fission. 
Some disclaimers: the question of whether experiences are physical 
entities will not be covered in this paper. Nothing discussed here hinges on the 
ontological status of experiences. If experiences are wholly physical entities, then 
it simply means that if personal persistence is dependent on phenomenal 
continuity, then personal persistence is a wholly physical affair.  
A second thing to note is that phenomenal realism is being taken as a 
background assumption of Dainton’s account. Phenomenal realism is the view 
that conscious experience is a part of the world alongside other equally real parts 
of it (like tables, mountains, etc.), whatever its detailed intrinsic nature may be. 
 10 
According to phenomenal realism, experiences are a basic feature of the world; 
they cannot be reduced to things that are non-experiential in nature. This is what 
Dainton meant by “taking experience seriously”.6 I will not dispute the truth of 
this assumption in this paper.   
                                               
6 Dainton 2006 p.1 
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Chapter 2 
The Phenomenal Continuity Account: The simple conception 
   
Before we can meaningfully talk about the relationship between 
experiences, we must first know what experiences are. There are many types of 
experience that we can have, including but not limited to perceptual experiences, 
emotions, and mental images, etc. In The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers notes, 
Consciousness can be startlingly intense. It is the most vivid of 
phenomena; nothing is more real to us. But it can be frustratingly 
diaphanous: in talking about conscious experience, it is notoriously 
difficult to pin down the subject matter. (Chalmers 1996. p.3) 
Attempting to define experience in more fundamental terms seems 
ultimately a fruitless and circular endeavor; experience is as basic as any concept 
can be. We, however, do know what it is to have experiences. Think about what it 
is like to see a flower or the setting sun. There is a certain feel to be basking in the 
sun at the beach, which is markedly different from the feel of being seated in a 
room listening to a lecture. There is something it is like to be angry, or to be 
feeling anxious about your examinations. We may not be able to describe exactly 
what these feelings are, but we are certainly familiar with them. 
Experiences that belong to a single subject at a time appear to be 
intimately related to, or unified with one another. Given how difficult it is to 
describe what an experience is, it is just as difficult, if not more so, to describe 
what the unity between experiences is like. Let us stipulate then, that when we are 
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talking about the unity between simultaneous experiences, we are referring to the 
awareness of all the simultaneous experiences we have at the same time. The 
perception of this unity may be something that cannot be described adequately in 
words, but at least we know that it is the feeling we get when we are aware of all 
the said experiences at the same time. 
To get a grasp on what this feeling of unity is, it will be helpful to reflect 
on our own experiences. Think about the experience of eating an ice-cream: the 
feeling of the cold and soft dessert in your mouth does not occur in complete 
isolation from the other experiences that you are having at the same time. You are 
conscious of your surroundings to varying degrees: maybe you are listening to a 
piece of music as you are enjoying your ice-cream, while being seated in a 
comfortable armchair in your room. The experience of eating the ice-cream is 
somehow part of the experience of being in the room, which also includes the 
experience of being seated in an armchair. In short, experiences that you have at 
the same time are more or less unified with each other. If someone were to ask 
you what you are doing while you are listening to the music in your room, you are 
able to answer that you are eating an ice-cream while being seated in an armchair. 
The experience of eating an ice-cream does not occur to the exclusion of other 
experiences—your other senses do not, as it were, “black out,” leaving you only 
with the sensation of the ice-cream in your mouth. 
When you clap your hands, you hear a sound which appears to come from 
between your hands. The visual image is somehow unified with the auditory 
experience such that we are naturally inclined to think, though falsely, that the 
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visual image produces the auditory experience. When you see yourself touching a 
table, your brain naturally tells you that the object of your sight and the object of 
your touch are one and the same thing. It seems that such unities amongst our 
perceptual experiences are ubiquitous to the point that we tend to overlook them 
unless we specially reflect upon our experiences.  
If your experiences at a time are completely isolated from each other, you 
would not be able to make comparisons between them. Yet it is a fact that we are 
able to do so. Imagine that you have two buckets of water, one of a higher 
temperature than the other. If you dip each of your hands into one bucket, one 
hand will feel hotter than the other. This means that you are experiencing two 
different temperatures at the same time. It also means that you are able to 
compare these two experiences. You will not be able to do so if the two 
experiences are not related to each other at all.  
 
The perception of change is the unity of experiences over time 
 
So far we have only been talking about synchronic experiences that belong 
to a single subject. However, there is a similarly intimate relationship between 
successive experiences which belong to a single subject. For one, we are able to 
perceive a certain order to experiences that happen in succession. The fact that we 
are able to perceive some experiences as earlier and others as later speaks of our 
(implicit) awareness of the intimate relationship between these successive 
experiences. If experiences are not related in such a way, we would not be able to 
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tell that one experience comes before or after another, or indeed, if there is any 
order at all to the presentation of experiences. 
To perceive change just is to have an earlier experience giving way to a 
later experience. For example, you are perceiving change when you see a bird 
flies across the sky, or when you see your fingers typing on the keyboard. Without 
the perception of change, all we can experience are frames of still pictures in 
succession.  
An experience of change is not merely a succession of experiences; it 
seems logically possible that one can have a succession of experiences without 
perceiving that her experiences are changing from one into another. Suppose there 
is a race of aliens whose brains are naturally brainwashed at a two second 
interval—that is, their brains are regularly wiped clean of any physical or mental 
changes that have been effected in the last two seconds. Within each two-second 
block, it is not inconceivable to think that their experiences will be much like 
ours—constantly flowing and ever changing. But between the two-second block, 
there is probably no experience that “reports”, as it were, the succession of the last 
experience in the earlier two-second block and the first experience in the later 
two-second block. It seems then that at every two-second interval, these aliens 
would have a succession of experiences but no experience of succession. 
The unity of the experiences, or the perception of change, must have been 
the result of some processing done in our brains. This perception of change is 
most probably imposed on the world by our experiential structure. This is 
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corroborated by the fact that some victims of severe brain damage suffer from 
abnormal or impaired perception of change.7 
In some cases, the unity between successive experiences is more obvious. 
In the case of music, it seems that we are able to experience the tune, as of 
hearing a tune, instead of merely a collection of notes. The four-note (short-short-
short-long) opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony is probably familiar to most 
so I shall use it as my example. The tune is somehow over and above the 
collection of the individual notes. This can be seen by how we can vary the pitch 
of the individual notes, and yet the tune is still recognizably the same. If you take 
away any of the four notes, the identity of the tune is utterly destroyed.  
In the case of speech, we are able to understand words which consist of 
more than one syllable. The word “understand” itself is made up of three syllables, 
and uttering only the first two syllables will provoke an understanding quite 
different from the whole word. In hearing the word “understand”, it seems that we 
perceive a unity in meaning quite over and above the individual syllables.  
William James gave a nice description of this diachronic unity: 
The unit of composition of our perception of time is a duration, with a 
bow and a stern, as it were—a rearward- and a forward-looking end. It is 
                                               
7 There is an extremely rare neuropsychological disorder Akinetopsia, otherwise known as motion 
blindness, which affects the brain’s ability to perceive motion. Patients inflicted with this disorder 
are unable to perceive motion, even though they are able to perceive stationary objects without any 
difficulty. In a paper by Zihl, J, D von Cramon and N Mai, they reported a case of a woman who 
“had difficulty, for example, in pouring tea or coffee into a cup because the fluid appeared to be 
frozen, like a glacier. In addition, she could not stop pouring at the right time since she was unable 
to perceive the movement in the cup (or a pot) when the fluid rose.” Another case mentioned in 
the same paper involves a 58-year-old patient who “could no longer perceive the movement of 
visual objects. She described her perceptual experience of a moving target as if the visual stimulus 
remained stationary but appeared at different successive positions.” The authors suggest that the 
disorder may be due to bilateral damage to the posterior brain. (see Zihl, J, D von Cramon and N 
Mai, 1983) 
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only as parts of this duration-block that the relation of succession of one 
end to the other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then feel the 
other after it, and from the perception of the succession infer an interval of 
time between, but we seem to feel the interval of time as a whole, with its 
two ends embedded in it. (James 1952, p. 399) 
 
Dainton’s Simple Conception account is an attempt to describe this 
intimate relationship between experiences over time and at a time. He proposes 
that this relationship that holds between experiences within a single subject is a 
form of primitive relationship, which he calls co-consciousness. All experiences 
that belong to a subject at a time and over time are supposed to be related in one 
way or the other by co-consciousness. Since co-consciousness is supposed to be a 
basic experiential relationship, resisting any attempts to reduce it to more 
fundamental elements, it would be helpful to contrast Dainton’s account with 
another account—the Awareness thesis. 
  
The Awareness thesis 
 
According to the Awareness thesis, there is an apparent unity amongst our 
experiences because our experiences are presented to a single act of awareness.8  
For the Awareness thesis, there is a two-level structure to conscious experience: at 
the first level, there are the experiential contents while at the second level there is 
                                               
8 See Husserl 1991, Broad 1923. See also Lockwood 1989, Ward 1887 and 1918, for a discussion 
of the awareness thesis. Dainton provides a nice characterization of the various forms of the 
awareness thesis in his book Stream of consciousness. (Dainton 2006) 
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the act that reveals them. Somewhat metaphorically, we can think of awareness as 
a beam of light shining down on a set of experiential contents and revealing them 
to the subject. To be aware of experiences just is for the experiences to be 
revealed to this awareness. Less metaphorically, we can cash awareness out in 
functional terms: to be aware of some experiences just is for these experiences to 
be available to you for deliberation, for verbal reports, or for directing your 
behavior.  
In a previous example, I talked about how we experience a clapping sound 
as coming from the visual image of a pair of clapping hands. According to the 
Awareness thesis, we experience such a unity simply because both the visual 
image and the auditory experience are presented to a single act of awareness. 
Deikman describes the doctrine as follows: 
Thus experience is dualistic, not the dualism of mind and matter, but the 
dualism of awareness and the contents of awareness. To put it another way, 
experience consists of the observer and the observed. Our sensations, our 
images, our thoughts – the mental activity by which we engage and define 
the world – all are part of the observed. In contrast, the observer – the ‘I’ 
is prior to everything else; without it there is no experience of existence. 
(Deikman 1996: pp. 351) 
Awareness is not only the binding element amongst simultaneous 
experiences, but also the binding element amongst diachronic experiences. 
Successive experiences which belong to a single subject are also presented to a 
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single awareness, and it is by virtue of this fact that the experiences are apparently 
unified over time.  
 
Diagram A 
[Refer to Diagram A] The black circles represent experiences that belong 
to a single subject. Successive experiences are unified by acts of awareness (A), 
as represented by the lines.  The overlapping oval shapes which encompass every 
two circles represent what some philosophers call specious presents. Specious 
presents are small durations of time in which all the experiences of a single 
subject are unified with each other. The length of each specious present however 
is difficult to determine, given how difficult it is to determine when an earlier 
experience stops being directly unified with its successor experiences.  
Take for example the solfège which consists of “do”, “re”, “mi”, “fa”, 
“sol”, “la”, and “ti”. When sung at a normal pace, the first two notes are probably 
fully unified with each other—thus belonging to the same specious present. The 
first note however, is probably not directly unified with the last note. While 
reciting the tune to myself, I find the first note disappearing from the forefront of 
A A A A 
Time  
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my consciousness by the time “sol” comes up. By the time “ti” comes up, no trace 
of “do” remains except in my memory. Indeed, it seems to me that each specious 
present can only consist of two or less notes sung at normal pace. My personal 
perception is not authoritative however—the length of each specious present 
probably varies between individuals, and there may be those who can perceive the 
diachronic unity of the solfège in its entirety. 
The first note is not entirely dissociated from the last note however: they 
still make up an entire tune together. The identity of the tune (for subjects like me 
who can only perceive two notes in one single specious present) is not given by a 
single unity, but by a number of overlapping unities within the tune itself. “Do” is 
directly unified with “re”, and although “do” is not directly unified with “me”, 
“re” is directly unified with “me”. Thus we can say that “do” is indirectly unified 
with “me”. The identity of the entire tune is thus given by overlapping specious 
presents, much like a chain made up of overlapping links. These overlapping 
specious presents define the identity of any one stream of consciousness: even if 
“do” is not directly unified with “ti”, they belong to the same stream of 
consciousness by virtue of being indirectly unified with each other.  
 
The Simple Conception 
 
Dainton also believes that there is just one relationship which holds 
amongst synchronic experiences and also amongst diachronic experiences. 
However, one significant difference between Dainton’s account and the 
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Awareness thesis is that Dainton’s account lacks an awareness-content bifurcation. 
Dainton thinks that there is a kind of primitive relationship which holds between 




Again, we can make sense of the Simple Conception account with the idea 
of overlapping specious presents. However, this time there are no acts of 
awareness which impose the unity “from above”. Dainton proposes that 
experiences themselves are “self-revealing”. This self-revealing property enables 
them to be unified in a bottom-up manner. Experiences are thus intrinsically 
conscious, which means that they require no additional act of awareness in order 
to be conscious. By their very nature, experiences are revealed to the subject and 
unified with other simultaneous experiences and some non-simultaneous 




This is not to say that we are always fully aware of all our experiences. 
We can be aware of our experiences to varying degrees, depending on the amount 
of attention we devote to different experiences. In saying that experiences are 
self-revealing, Dainton is suggesting that there is a minimal degree of awareness 
that we have of all our experiences. This kind of awareness, however, is not a 
separate act over and above the experiences like the acts of awareness propounded 
in the Awareness thesis. This awareness is somehow part of the intrinsic nature of 
experiences themselves. It is also largely passive, requiring little or no attention at 
all.  
Following Dainton, we say that simultaneous experiences which are 
apparently unified in this way are synchronically co-conscious, and any non-
simultaneous experiences which are apparently unified, or continuous with each 
other, are diachronically co-conscious. The unity of experience is an experience 
in its own right. That is to say, experiences which are related by co-consciousness 
constitute a further (more complex) experience.  
Synchronic co-consciousness: An experience X is synchronically co-
conscious with another experience Y if there is an experience Z that has 
both X and Y as phenomenal parts.  
Diachronic co-consciousness: An experience X is diachronically co-
conscious with an earlier or later experience Y if there is an experience Z 
that has both X and Y as phenomenal parts. 
Diachronic unity of experiences, or more aptly, continuity or connection of 
experiences over time, refers to the flow of experience in a stream of 
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consciousness. As pointed out earlier, experiences are not completely isolated 
from the experiences before and after them. Every experience lasts a short while, 
and gets replaced seamlessly by some other experiences. Most of the time, you 
feel a continuous presence of experiences, with no obvious breaks in between 
them. This continuity of experience is what is termed as the flow of experience. In 
Dainton and Bayne’s words, 
A typical stream of consciousness is not a succession of discrete 
experiential atoms, far from it. Each brief phase of a stream of 
consciousness is experienced as flowing into the next. Think of what it is 
like to suffer a prolonged toothache, or to hear an extended tone played on 
a flute, or to watch a balloon float slowly across the sky. Each phase of 
your experience merges seamlessly with the next, and the next—indeed, 
so seamless is the flow that the division of experiences of this kind into 
distinct phases is often entirely arbitrary. (Dainton and Bayne 2005) 
Dainton believes that this continuity within successive experiences partly 
constitutes personal persistence over time. However, diachronic co-consciousness 
between experiences alone is insufficient for defining personal persistence over 
time. Diachronic co-consciousness probably holds only amongst experiences 
which are not separated by too great a temporal distance. Once we consider 
experiences which are separated by more than a few hours, it seems implausible 
to think that they can form an experiential unity. Take for example the experience 
you have upon waking up from bed this morning—it is not part of your current 
experience. Yet surely you are the same self who woke up this morning.  
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For personal persistence, something weaker than direct diachronic co-
consciousness is needed. We say that two experiences are directly diachronically 
co-conscious (or directly co-conscious for short) when they form an experiential 
unity. When two successive experiences form an experiential unity, we can 
perceive the later experience as immediately continuous with the earlier 
experience. As mentioned previously, our experience of waking up in the morning 
does not form an experiential unity with your current experience. However, even 
if the experiences in the morning are not directly co-conscious with your current 
experiences, they are directly co-conscious with some immediately following 
experiences, which are in turn directly co-conscious with other immediately 
following experiences, and it goes on, forming an unbroken chain of directly co-
conscious experiences which has your current experiences at its end. We can then 
say that even though the morning experiences are not directly co-conscious with 
your current experiences, the morning experiences are indirectly diachronically 
co-conscious (or indirectly co-conscious for short) with them.  
For A’s experiences to be phenomenally continuous with B’s experiences 
just is for A’s experiences to be directly or indirectly co-conscious with B’s 
experiences. Dainton writes in the Stream of Consciousness: 
… it is plain that although only brief and adjoining phases of a stream are 
co-conscious, co-consciousness is also responsible for the unity of a 
stream as a whole. Co-streamal experiences separated by more than the 
duration of the specious present are not directly co-conscious, but they are 
co-conscious with an intervening succession of overlapping specious 
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presents, which themselves are linked by co-consciousness… (Dainton 
2006 pp. 166-167) 
 
For convenience, we can also say that self A is phenomenally continuous 
with self B if and only if A’s experiences are phenomenally continuous with B’s 
experiences.  
 
Phenomenal continuity: Self A is phenomenally continuous with self B if 
and only if A’s experiences are either directly or indirectly diachronically 
co-conscious with B’s experiences.  
Phenomenal continuity alone is not sufficient for personal persistence over 
a subject’s entire lifetime. Throughout a subject’s waking hours, her non-
simultaneous experiences are all phenomenally continuous with each other. 
However, when she goes to sleep or falls into a coma, it is likely that she ceases to 
have any experiences. Recall the times when you wake up in the morning feeling 
as though you have only slept minutes despite a whole night’s sleep. It is natural 
to think that during such nights there are periods when you have no experiences at 
all. Yet surely you are the same self as the night before. Dainton calls this the 
“bridging problem”; his account needs to explain how selves can persist over 
periods of experience-free states, given that personal persistence is defined in 
terms of phenomenal continuity.9 
                                               
9 See Dainton and Bayne 2005 for a more comprehensive discussion of the bridging problem, and 
their solution to it.  
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To account for personal persistence across such experience-free periods—
call them periods of “deep sleep”—Dainton proposes that personal persistence is 
possible as long as the potential for experience remains, even if the subject is 
currently not having any experiences. We can call such potentials experiential 
powers. Experiential powers are fields of potential which are capable of 
producing experiences. A functioning brain is one example of a system which has 
experiential powers. During deep sleep, a self continues to possess experiential 
powers—if she had been awake, she would have produced experiences. And if 
she continues to possess the same experiential powers when she wakes up, she is 
the same self before and after deep sleep. 
Hence, an earlier self is the same as a later self if and only if they share the 
same experiential powers. According to Dainton, an earlier self shares the same 
experiential powers with a later self if and only if their experiential powers, if 
active, would have produced experiences which are diachronically co-conscious 
with each other. Thus an earlier self is the same as a later self if and only if their 
experiential powers, if active, would have produced experiences which are 
diachronically co-conscious with each other. In short, for a self who is awake, all 
of her experiences are phenomenally continuous with each other, and when she is 
asleep, her experiences would have been phenomenally continuous with each 







Diagram C1 and C2 illustrate how a self persists over deep sleep. In 
Diagram C1, before the self goes into deep sleep, her successive experiences are 
diachronically co-conscious with each other. When she goes into deep sleep, her 
pre-sleep experiences are no longer diachronically co-conscious with any of her 
current experiences for the simple reason that she is no longer having any 
experiences. However, the pre-sleep experiences would have been co-conscious 
After sleep Sleep 
EP (n -1) EP (n) EP (n+1) 
Before sleep Sleep 
EP 1 EP 2 EP 3 
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with some experiences if her experiential powers were active (and hence 
producing experiences). In other words, she would have a continuous stream of 
consciousness if she were not asleep.  
(Refer to Diagram C2) When the self wakes up, her post-sleep experiences 
are not diachronically co-conscious with any immediately preceding experiences, 
but they would have been co-conscious with some preceding experiences if her 
experiential powers were active at that time. Thus according to Dainton, an earlier 
self is the same as a later self if and only if the earlier self has experiences which 
are or would have been phenomenally continuous with the later self’s experiences 
At first sight, personal persistence seems to be defined in a disjunctive 
manner in the Simple Conception account: a self persists over time if and only if 
her experiences are (1) phenomenally continuous with some later experiences, or 
(2) would have been phenomenally continuous with some later experiences if her 
experiential powers were active. However, we can simplify the definition since 
the two disjuncts of the definition are supposed to have co-extensive results when 
the subject is awake. When the subject is awake, it is both true that her successive 
experiences are all phenomenally continuous with each other and that her 
successive experiences would have been phenomenally continuous with each 
other if her experiential powers were active. Only when the subject is in deep 
sleep, the first disjunct is not being fulfilled. At such times, the second disjunct 
does the bulk of the work in accounting for personal persistence.  
Even so, we can treat the situation of deep sleep as the same as when the 
subject is awake, since the subject is supposed to have persisted through time if 
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she would have phenomenally continuous experiences if her experiential powers 
were active. It would simplify matters greatly then to just frame the discussion 
here in terms of a subject who is conscious throughout. The results would apply 
equally to a subject who has intermittent states of unconsciousness.  
It is not my aim in this paper to argue for Dainton’s account of personal 
persistence. However, it will be useful to see what motivates such an account, 
before we start prying it apart.  
 
Motivating Dainton’s Account 
 
In “Consciousness as a guide to Personal Persistence”, Tim Bayne and 
Barry Dainton argue that phenomenal continuity is essential for personal survival. 
They discuss a puzzle case developed by Bernard Williams. 10  I simplify the 
scenarios of the puzzle as follows11: 
1. You are a subversive who has just been apprehended by the 
authorities. The authorities want to torture you in order to 
extract some crucial information. To avoid leaving incriminating 
torture marks on you, they will relocate you to another body, on 
which the torture will be carried out. Thanks to advances in 
neuro-technology, your brain need not be transferred in order for 
you to change bodies: instead, all of your psychological states 
(including personality, memories, beliefs and intentions, etc.), 
                                               
10 Williams 1970. See also Williams 1957 for an argument for the bodily continuity account.  
11 Dainton and Bayne 2006 
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will be copied from your brain to the new one. After the transfer 
of psychological states, you wake up in a new body. 
 
2. You are a subversive who is about to be apprehended by the 
authorities. You know that if you are apprehended, you will be 
tortured, and crucial information about your group will be 
compromised. Your fellow subversives, fearing that you might 
divulge these crucial information, decided to put you through a 
procedure that will input in you a whole new set of 
psychological states (including personality, memories, beliefs 
and intentions etc.) taken from someone who has no knowledge 
of your group’s dealings. You are not overjoyed at the prospect 
of undergoing such a procedure however: having a new set of 
psychological states will not prevent you from feeling the torture 
inflicted on your body. At most, you will not remember that you 
were a subversive while being tortured. The degree of pain will 
surely be the same.  
Dainton and Bayne agree with Williams that in the first scenario, our 
intuitions are pulled in the direction of psychological continuity—you survive as 
the self who is psychologically continuous with you. They also agree that in the 
second scenario, our intuitions are pulled in the direction of bodily continuity—
you survive as the self who is bodily continuous with you. However, both 
scenarios are supposed to be two different descriptions of the same situation—it 
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seems then that we have contradictory intuitions about a single situation at the 
same time.  
Bernard Williams goes on to argue that only the second intuition—that of 
bodily continuity—is the correct one. Dainton and Bayne however think that this 
puzzle case shows that the two mainstream accounts of personal persistence—the 
psychological continuity account and the bodily continuity account—are both 
inadequate in explaining our deepest intuitions about personal persistence. They 
argue that the intuitions in the Williams’ puzzle case are contradictory mainly 
because we are in the dark as to whether phenomenal continuity is preserved. If, 
however, we know the direction of phenomenal continuity—which self you are 
phenomenally continuous with—we would be in no doubt about which self you 
survive as. Dainton and Bayne argue that when phenomenal continuity diverges 
from psychological continuity, personal identity goes with the former. Similarly, 
when phenomenal continuity diverges from bodily continuity, personal identity 
goes with the former as well. 
A simple thought experiment can show that personal identity goes with 
phenomenal continuity instead of psychological continuity. Imagine Jane is in the 
living room watching her favorite television show when she suddenly suffers 
from a stroke. As it turns out, the stroke is so severe that the parts of the brain 
responsible for her memories, beliefs, desires, and character are all utterly 
destroyed. The parts of the brain responsible for producing experiences, however, 
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are miraculously left intact.12 Let us suppose that Jane does not notice herself 
having the stroke. She continues to have experiences that are unified from one 
moment to the next, even while her psychological states are changed drastically.  
It seems that Jane would survive the stroke, even while most of her 
psychological states (excluding her phenomenal states) are changed. If she 
continues to have experiences that are unified from moment to moment, how can 
it possibly be denied that she survives the stroke? This conclusion is compelling if 
we consider the fact that at any given time, practically all of our psychological 
states are dormant and have no bearing on the phenomenal character of our 
experience at that time. This is especially true when we are not engaged in a 
cognitively demanding activity. If so, there could be no difference to Jane’s 
experiences despite the sudden disappearance of her psychological states (most of 
which are lying dormant). If there is no difference to Jane’s experiences, then it 
seems that she survives the stroke. 
Another thought experiment can be used to show that personal identity 
goes with phenomenal continuity instead of bodily continuity. Suppose that Jim is 
due to use the teleportation machine to travel to Mars. The teleportation machine 
will blast his body into atoms, analyze the basic constitution of his body, and send 
the data to Mars where a twin machine will use an entirely new set of atoms to re-
create Jim’s body according to the original constitution. There is obviously no 
bodily continuity in this case.  
                                               
12 For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the parts of the brain that are responsible for 
producing experiences are independent of the parts of the brain responsible for memories, beliefs, 
desires and character.  
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Let us call the original Jim, Jim A, and the Jim on Mars, Jim B. Suppose 
that Jim A’s experiences right before the teleportation are unified with the 
experiences of Jim B right after the teleportation. That is to say, Jim A’s 
experiences are continuous with Jim B’s. It seems intuitive that Jim survives the 
teleportation process, despite having no bodily continuity with the original body. 
Notice that we are able to pass this judgment even though we have no information 
regarding the psychological states. This means that we judged that Jim survives 
the process simply because phenomenal continuity is preserved. In other words, 
phenomenal continuity determines personal persistence. 
Dainton and Bayne argue that when the three forms of continuity—
psychological continuity, bodily continuity, and phenomenal continuity—come 
apart as they do in the thought experiments, we have the intuition that we survive 
as the being which is phenomenally continuous with the original self. They think 
that in considering our future, we want our experiences to continue more than we 
want our psychological states to continue. That is to say, given a choice, most 
people would prefer to have their experiences continue to flow into some later 
experiences, instead of having their psychological states being causally related to 
some later psychological states (again, assuming that the phenomenal states and 
psychological states are independent). And this seems to have some intuitive pull: 
if my phenomenal consciousness continues into the future, how can it be denied 
that I survive? On the other hand, if my psychological states continue to be 
causally related to some later psychological states, but my phenomenal 
consciousness ceases permanently, it seems highly doubtful that I survive at all. 
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To some people, this conclusion seems question begging: the self 
sustaining the phenomenal stream of consciousness will naturally think that it is 
the original self, but that does not mean that it is the original self. In fact, the 
original body with the original set of psychological states would also believe that 
it is the original self. If we privilege one self’s belief over the other, then we are 
already assuming that personal identity goes with phenomenal continuity. 
However, Dainton and Bayne are not arguing that personal persistence is 
based on the belief of the self sustaining the phenomenal stream of consciousness. 
In fact, the self sustaining the original phenomenal stream of consciousness could 
believe that she is a different self from the original self, since she has a different 
set of beliefs from the original self! Despite all these, it seems that our intuitions 
still tell us that the identity of the original self goes with the phenomenal stream 
of consciousness. If our intuitions are a good gauge of personal persistence, then 




There is something to be said for Dainton and Bayne’s account of 
phenomenal continuity. At the very least, it seems to capture some of the 
intuitions about personal persistence, especially from the first person’s point of 
view. Understanding what motivates this account will aid us in understanding 




The Various Ways Selves Might be Thought to Undergo Fission 
 
If selves are streams of consciousness as Dainton suggests, then two 
streams of consciousness constitute a single self if and only if the earlier stream is 
phenomenally continuous with the later stream of consciousness. For a stream of 
consciousness to undergo fission just is for the stream to be phenomenally 
continuous with two separate and distinct streams of consciousness at the same 
time.  
To understand the various ways selves can undergo fission, we can start 
with envisioning the following thought experiment (developed by Parfit and 
modified for my purpose). A self X undergoes surgery to have half his brain 
removed. During the surgery, he experiences the transition from pre-surgery to 
post-surgery; or in other words, he feels himself surviving the surgery while it is 
being done (we are supposing that the man is conscious throughout the surgery).13 
According to Dainton’s account, the post-surgery self should qualify as the same 
self as the pre-surgery self X since his experiences are phenomenally continuous 
with self X’s experiences.  
At the same time, however, the half of the brain that was removed is being 
transplanted into another body. This half of the brain in the new body also has the 
experience of the transition from pre-surgery to post-surgery (again we are 
supposing the brain-half remains conscious as it is being transplanted). This self 
                                               
13 Or if the man is unconscious during the surgery, it is still true that he would experience the 
transition from pre-surgery to post-surgery if he were conscious.  
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with the second body should similarly qualify as the same self as the original self 
X according to Dainton’s account.  It would not make a difference if both halves 
of the brain were to be unconscious throughout the surgery. Recall that under 
Dainton’s account, an earlier self is the same as a later self if and only if the 
experiences of the earlier self would have been phenomenally continuous with the 
later self if their experiential powers were to be active. Thus cashing out the 
thought experiment in terms of a conscious brain merely simplifies, and does not 
change, the argument. 
Does the original self survive the surgery? There are three possible 
answers with regards to this question: 1. the self does not survive; 2. the self 
survives as only one of the post-surgery selves; 3. the self survives as both post-
surgery selves.  
Dainton thinks that option 3 is the correct option. It is useful to see how he 
might argue for this option. A possible line of argument is as follows: it is 
unreasonable to believe in Option 1. Subjects are known to survive surgeries in 
which half their brains are removed. 14  If the self X actually experienced the 
transition from pre-surgery to post-surgery, and is able to detail what he felt when 
he went under the knife, then it is inconceivable that he did not survive. Option 2 
is similarly unreasonable: if we think that selves can survive with half of their 
brains, then it will be arbitrary to claim that the original self survives as only one 
of the post-surgery selves. This is especially so if the two selves are each able to 
                                               
14 This procedure is known as hemispherectomy. Doctors remove half of the patient’s brain, 
usually to treat severe cases of epilepsy or cancer in the brain. Studies on some of these post-
surgery patients suggest that these individuals are the same selves before and after the surgery. See 
“http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15009226” for a report on the effects of hemispherectomy. 
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report the experienced transition from pre-surgery to post-surgery. Thus the 
original self must have survived as both selves, given that only option 3 is left.  
There may be a fourth option, however. Someone could argue that there 
must be two selves in the first place: the body houses two selves, and each self is 
sustained by a different half of the brain. When the brain is split into two separate 
halves, each half continues to sustain one self each. This is not a case of fission, 
however, but of two closely related selves each surviving in an ordinary, non-
fissile way. Taking up this option means that we are committed to the strange 
proposition that some humans have two selves in a single body. This option 
multiplies the number of selves beyond what commonsense tells us. If all things 
are equal, we ought to prefer an option which is ontologically more economical 
than option 4. Option 4 is hence best reserved as a last option.  
Dainton chooses option 3, understood to mean that the original self 
undergoes fission to become two selves, and argues extensively in his book The 
Phenomenal Self for a way to accommodate fission.15 My goal is to argue that 
Dainton cannot consistently do so; i.e. the possibility of fission is incompatible 
with Dainton’s account, despite his claims to the contrary.  
 
How a Single Stream of Consciousness Divides 
 
Let us use the brain surgery thought experiment discussed above as our 
starting point. I will assume that the point of fission (if fission is possible) is the 
                                               
15 Dainton 2008 
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instant in which half of the brain is surgically detached from the other half, which 
is before it is actually transplanted into the new body. Thus I assume that fission, 
if possible at all, occurs in an instant.  
Since the brain halves are assumed to be conscious throughout the 
surgeries, they will have experiences immediately preceding and immediately 
following the point of fission. Even if the brain halves are not actually conscious 
throughout the surgeries, they would have experiences that are phenomenally 
continuous throughout the surgeries if their experiential powers were active. This 
is stipulated in the previous section (refer to footnotes 12 and 13). 
It is not unthinkable that the brain halves can have experiences 
immediately following the point of fission, before they are transplanted into a new 
body. Experiences are not restricted to merely sensory perceptions; there are also 
emotions, thoughts, mental images, etc. It does not seem absurd to think that 
many of these experiences can continue to exist even if the brain is not connected 
to any human body, as long as the brain continues to be sustained by the 
necessary nutrients. 
Assuming that fission is possible, there are two things that we can say with 
regards to the identity of the two post-fission selves. Firstly we might say that the 
two post-fission selves are numerically identical to each other. The two resulting 
beings are one single self in two bodies. This, I will argue, is not a coherent 
option: if the two beings are really one single self in two bodies, then there is no 
fission of identity. Secondly we might say that the two post-fission selves are not 
numerically identical to each other. This essentially amounts to two selves 
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sharing a common part of their lives, namely the part before the point of fission. I 
will discuss these two options in turn. 
 
Numerically Identical Post-fission Selves 
 
To imagine a self surviving as two selves numerically identical to each 
other is to imagine a self with a divided mind. After the brain transplant surgery, 
the self simply finds himself looking through two sets of eyes, even though the 
two bodies are not physically connected to each other. What this amounts to is 
nothing more than a self who has grown an extra set of hands, legs, head… in fact 
a complete body. While it might prove disorienting at first for the self (how does 
one control four arms at the same time!), it is not unthinkable that he will get used 
to it eventually. Just imagine the case of a handicapped man who regains his 
walking ability after ten years of being wheelchair bound; he is sure to encounter 
some difficulty at first in controlling his newly recovered legs, but it is nothing 
that he cannot get used to given sufficient physiotherapy.  
However, given the description, there seems to be just one center of 
consciousness and just one center of control for all the limbs. Surely we would 
not think that you have become two selves if you grow an extra set of arms. This 
is true even if you grow an extra set of every other body part as well, including a 
new head. If one day you should wake up finding yourself looking through two 
sets of eyes, and controlling two separate bodies, you might feel disoriented and 
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wonder which body you really reside within (if that question even make sense to 
you!), but surely you do not doubt that you are still a single self.  
A stream of consciousness is defined as a set of experiences in which all 
its members are either directly or indirectly co-conscious with each other. A being 
with an extra head but with his every experience within each head co-conscious 
with the experiences in the other head seems to possess just a single stream of 
consciousness. If so, then no fission of identity took place: the original stream of 
consciousness simply flows on as before, as a single stream, albeit with altered 
character after the surgery: now it is constituted of two interconnected spheres of 
experience each in a different physical space (the body). A man with two heads 
may be able to perform mathematical calculations better than the average human 
due to the extra boost in processing power, but that does not make him two selves.  
In conclusion, it seems that there is only one self before and after the brain 
transplant surgery if there remains just one center of consciousness, i.e. all the 
experiences in one body are co-conscious with the experiences in the other body. 
Therefore if the two resulting post-surgery selves are numerically identical with 
each other, then fission has not taken place.  
 
Numerically Distinct Post-fission Selves 
 
If the above is correct, then it cannot be coherently claimed that the two 
post-fission selves are numerically identical. To do so is to make the two resulting 
streams of consciousness essentially just one stream of consciousness, contrary to 
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the idea of fission. Therefore the best (and only) construal of fission is to claim 
that the two resulting selves are numerically distinct.  
At first sight, this seems to be impossible: if a stream of consciousness A 
survives as two later streams of consciousness B and C, and if we take survival to 
mean numerical identity between the earlier and later streams, it is natural to think 
that the two post-fission streams of consciousness are numerically identical to 
each other as well. After all, numerical identity is transitive: if B is identical with 
A, and A is identical with C, then B is identical with C.  
Perhaps the best way to construe this option is not to think that the earlier 
and later streams of consciousness are numerically identical, i.e. survival does not 
imply identity. When we say that the pre-fission stream survives as one of the 
post-fission streams, we are not saying that the pre-fission stream is exactly 
similar to the post-fission stream. We are saying that the pre-fission stream and 
the post-fission stream together constitute a single stream of consciousness. This 
is analogous to how the handle of a cup and the rest of the cup together constitute 
a whole cup. When we are pointing at the cup handle and saying that it is the 
same cup as when we are pointing at the cup body, we are not making a mistake. 
Similarly, when we are “pointing” at the pre-fission stream and saying that it is 
the same stream as the post-fission stream, we are not making a mistake. The pre-
fission stream and post-fission stream together make up a single larger stream of 
consciousness.  
It is obvious that we are not talking about numerical identity between the 
earlier and later parts of a single stream of consciousness: the parts are loosely 
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speaking identical only because they belong to the same stream of consciousness. 
To prevent confusion, we should avoid the use of the term numerical identity. We 
can simply say that a self survives as a later self if the pre-fission stream and the 
post-fission stream together constitute a single stream of consciousness. Given 
this manner of construal, there is no problem with thinking that a self can survive 
as two selves which are numerically distinct from each other, since the earlier self 
is not numerically identical with any of the later selves. 
This brings us to the standard manner of construing how a self can survive 
fission as two other selves at the same time: the two post-fission selves are 
distinct but they share a common temporal part (or a group of temporal slices), 
namely the entire stream of consciousness before the time of fission. The idea of 
temporal parts comes from Four-Dimensionalism, a theory about identity and 
change over time.16 According to Four-Dimensionalism, temporal parts are akin 
to spatial parts. Your right hand occupies a different part of space from your left 
leg, but they are all part of you—they are your spatial parts. We say that objects 
have spatial parts when they are extended in space. According to Four-
Dimensionalism, objects are extended in time too. For example, you-yesterday is 
a different temporal part from you-today, but both you-yesterday and you-today 
are parts of you—they are your temporal parts. This also means that you are never 
wholly present at any one point of time: at any one instant, only a temporal slice 
of you is present. The whole-you is made up of all the temporal parts you have 
                                               
16 See David Lewis 1986 and Theodore Sider 2001 for some examples of Four-Dimensionalism. 
See also Rea 1998 for an argument against Four-Dimensionalism. 
 42 
over a lifetime. You are a four-dimensional object that is extended through time 
much in the same way as how you are extended in space.  
Objects can share spatial parts; for example, two adjoining rooms can 
share the same wall. According to Four-Dimensionalism, selves as four-
dimensional objects can share temporal parts in the same way. If fission is 
possible, then two selves can share an entire stretch of temporal parts before the 
point of fission.  
The idea of selves as four-dimensional objects complements the idea of 
selves as streams of consciousness. Suppose we call the complete set of 
synchronic experiences of a self at a time as a total synchronic experience, then a 
total synchronic experience will correspond to a temporal slice of a self. Each 
temporal slice is connected to its immediately preceding and following temporal 
slices by the relationship of co-consciousness. It is this relationship of co-
consciousness that makes the set of temporal slices more than just a loose 
collection of individual parts—together, they constitute a single stream of 
consciousness. 
 This manner of construal allows us to conceive and speak of two distinct 
selves being one self in the past, simply by sharing a common part of their lives. 
“Sharing” in this sense is atemporal: two selves can share a common part of their 
lives as long as they have a common temporal part in the past, are having it now, 
or will be having it in the future. With this way of conceptualizing sharing, we 
can now say that the fission twins are the same self before a certain time by 
sharing a common temporal part. 
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What fission is not 
 
Fission only happens when there is one original self who splits into two 
selves existing at the same time. A procedure in which two distinct, but physically 
connected, selves are separated from each other is not considered fission. For 
example, a surgery that physically separates a pair of Siamese twins intuitively 
does not count as fission.  
Further suppose that our left brain and right brain each houses one self, 
and that these two selves have always acted in such perfect unison that no one, 
including themselves, suspects that there are two selves all along. When half of 
the brain is being transplanted into a new body, all that is achieved is one of the 
two selves being relocated to a new body. At the point of surgery, these two 
selves merely come apart spatially; there is no personal fission at all since there 
are two separate streams of consciousness all along. Think of two river streams 
which flow side by side, but without actually merging at all; when one stream 
veers off into another direction, it is merely a separation of a trivial sort, and not 
one stream becoming two.  
 
Diagram D 
Time  Time  
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Such non-fissile cases are akin to how Siamese twins are separated by 
surgery—while there is separation of the flesh, there is no separation of identity 
since the two post-surgery selves were not identical to begin with. Since there 
were two selves all along, such cases cannot be considered as fission. This is 
different from the case where just one stream of consciousness divides into two 
separate streams at the same time. The difference is illustrated by diagram D; the 
figure on the left (representing fission) shows two streams of consciousness which 
share a common part before a certain time. Before the time of fission, the two 
streams are not distinct from each other. On the other hand, the figure on the right 
shows separation of the kind where two distinct and separate streams existed all 




Thus far, I have discussed two different ways of construing fission. The 
first way is to construe the post-fission selves as numerically identical with each 
other. I have shown that this option is incoherent. The second way is to construe 
the post-fission selves as numerically distinct from each other. I argued that only 
the second way is coherent, and provided us with a way of talking about fission 
using the idea of temporal parts. At the same time, personal fission is 
distinguished from mere physical separation. 
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Chapter 4 
Why Dainton’s account is Incompatible with the Possibility of 
Fission 
 
In this chapter, I will discuss two features of Dainton’s Simple Conception 
account that are apparently incompatible with the possibility of fission. The first 
feature is a version of experiential (or phenomenal) holism, which may seem 
implausibly strong at first sight. There are two reasons to think that this version of 
experiential holism is incompatible with the possibility of fission; I will discuss 
the two reasons in turn. Towards the end of the first two sections however, I will 
suggest that the incompatibility of phenomenal holism with fission is only an 
apparent one. The second feature is Dainton’s account of co-consciousness. Here, 
I will argue that given how Dainton characterizes co-consciousness, it is 
impossible for subjects to undergo fission.  
 
Holism and its Implications 
 
Experiences can be simple, or complex. The distinction between simple 
experiences and complex experiences may be arbitrary to some extent. Even a 
simple experience of reading a book may be further distinguished into finer 
experiences of perceiving shapes and color. It seems that a condition for a simple 
experience to be part of a complex experience is that the simple experience must 
be co-conscious with the other simple experiences which make up the complex 
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experience. Let us call the set of experiences in which every element is directly 
co-conscious with each other a total experience. A total experience is an 
experience in its own right, albeit a complex one.  
According to the Simple Conception account, co-consciousness is a 
relationship which affects the intrinsic character of the experiences involved. 
Thus a total experience is holistic in this manner. To say that a given set of 
experiences is holistic is to say that the integral experiences are intrinsically 
dependent for their phenomenal character on other experiences in the same set. 
To illustrate how a given set of experiences can be holistic, we can do 
some basic phenomenological exercises on the experience of reading a book. To 
say that the experience of reading a book is part of a set of holistic experiences is 
to say that the intrinsic phenomenal character of this experience is affected by the 
other experiences in the set. The experience of reading a book is probably very 
different if I am reading in a boiler room instead of being in an air-conditioned 
room. I may not be as focused or patient when I am reading in the boiler room, 
and that surely have some phenomenological effects on my experience of reading. 
And without a doubt, I will not consider the experience of reading in the boiler 
room as enjoyable, in contrast to reading in an air-conditioned room. It seems that 
to some degree, the phenomenal character of experiences can be affected by the 
other experiences that a subject has at the same time.  
If a set of experiences is holistic, then the integral experiences are affected 
in such a way that they cannot occur except in the presence of the same, or similar, 
accompanying experiences.  
 47 
Holism: Experiences are made up of simpler experiences whose intrinsic 
phenomenal character reflects the character of the whole in such a way 
that the simpler experiences cannot occur except in the same whole, or a 
similar one.  
 
According to holism, experiences are irrevocably “colored” by the stream 
of consciousness they are in, in such a way that they could not possibly occur in 
another dissimilar stream of consciousness or on their own. If the intrinsic 
phenomenal character of experiences is dependent on the streams of 
consciousness they occur in, then their existence are by extension dependent on 
the existence of the streams of consciousness; they are hence un-detachable from 
the wholes they exist in. This is not to say that a stream of consciousness cannot 
be logically distinguished into different parts. We can still distinguish the 
experience of eating an ice-cream from the experience of sun-tanning on the 
beach, even if they both occur in the same stream of consciousness, but we also 
think that neither could have occurred in another stream of consciousness.  
Non-holism on the other hand likens experiences in a stream of 
consciousness to sticks in a bundle; even though the sticks are bundled together, 
they can be taken apart and re-bundled into a different set. According to non-
holism, experiences which belong to a single stream of consciousness can exist in 
a different stream of consciousness or on their own without any change in their 
intrinsic character. The identity of the experiences is not affected in any way by 
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the wholes the experiences exist in. In other words, experiences are not dependent 
on their streams of consciousness for their existence.  
Do we have any reasons to believe that our experiences are holistic? There 
is some evidence that suggests so. Psychologists who belong to the Gestalt school 
propose that there are certain degrees of phenomenological interdependence 
amongst our experiences.  
 
Diagram E Müller-Lyer illusion17  
In the Müller-Lyer illusion (Diagram E), we perceive the center line of the 
left figure to be longer than the center line of the right figure, even though both 
lines are actually of the same length. The orientation of the fins clearly affects our 
perception of the length of the center line. In this case, the Y-shape figure makes 
its center line seems longer than it actually is, while the pointy-shape figure 
makes its center line seems shorter than it actually is. Since there are objective 
ways of measuring the lines, like using a ruler, it cannot be denied that our 
perception is skewed in some ways by the presence of the fins. D.W. Hamlyn 
notes that “(it) is the total context that is relevant, not just the lines themselves, 
and we may account for the illusion by reference to this total context.”  This is but 
                                               
17 The two Gestalt figures in this section are taken from Nevid 2003 pp. 126. 
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one example of phenomenal holism that the Gestalt psychologists allude to. 
Another figure with the same principle is the Ponzo illusion (Diagram F). 
 
Diagram F Ponzo illusion  
In the Ponzo illusion, the upper horizontal line seems longer than the 
lower horizontal line, even though they are actually of the same length. The 
converging lines at the side may have created the impression that the upper 
horizontal line is further away (into the page) and hence longer than the lower line 
which is perceived as closer to us.  
Illusions like the Müller-Lyer and Ponzo serve to illustrate the point that 
our experiences are holistic in nature—phenomenal interdependencies exist 
between the different elements of a single complex experience. Steven Lehar puts 
it thus in his book on Gestalt psychology: “…(there) must be some kind of global 
process at work in visual recognition, which operates on the image as a whole, 
rather than in a piecewise manner building up from local features.”  
The Gestalt psychologists do not think that such examples are merely 
exceptions within our sensory perceptions which crop up from time to time. 
Rather, they are indications of a phenomenon which is present ubiquitously in our 
experiences. Our everyday experiences may seem free of such phenomenal 
interdependencies, but it is only because the perceptual illusions are so natural 
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that we simply do not notice them. It takes a very clear example like the Müller-
Lyer to point out such interdependencies to us. Take for example the corner of a 
room when viewed from inside of the room: the corner may seem clearly of a 
certain height, but it may have appeared longer than it actually is since the 
adjoining walls are diverging towards us, just like the figure in the left side of the 
Müller-Lyer illusion.  
While a few examples like the two figures shown here may not prove that 
phenomenal holism is widespread in our sensory perceptions, they do go some 
way towards suggesting that our experiences are holistic in nature. What 
implications do the findings of the Gestalt school have for Dainton’s Simple 
Conception account? That depends largely on how serious we take the findings to 
be. If we take the Gestalt effect to be minimal and that it fails to apply to most of 
our experiences, then we might think that the implications are similarly minimal 
as well. If on the other hand, we take the Gestalt effect to be indicative of a 
widespread phenomenon that is present ubiquitously in our experiences, then it 
may be that the implications are very far-reaching indeed. Dainton himself 
appears to embrace a similar version of holism. 
In Stream of Consciousness, Dainton writes of a similar version of holism 
amongst three musical notes Do-Re-Mi, 
Suppose that Re had been followed by Fa rather than Mi. The global 
character of Re would reflect this fact: it would be of the form ‘a Re-type 
experience preceded by a Do-type experience and succeeded by a Fa-type 
experience’, as opposed to ‘a Re-type experience preceded by a Do-type 
 51 
experience and succeeded by a Mi-type experience’. (Dainton 2006 p. 230) 
(My emphasis in italics) 
 
To this extent, the identity of an experience is sensitive to the characters of 
the earlier and/or later experiences with which it is co-conscious. 
(Dainton 2006 p.230) (My emphasis in italics) 
By local character, Dainton is referring to the phenomenal qualities of an 
experience with respect to its specific modality. For example, the local character 
of a thunderclap is its auditory quality. The global character of a thunderclap, on 
the other hand, is not restricted to being auditory. The global character of a 
thunderclap is the quality of being co-conscious with an earlier flash of lightning 
if it is preceded by the perception of a flash of lightning. An auditory experience 
can have the global character of being co-conscious with a visual experience 
without affecting the local character. Try to imagine the difference in the 
experience of listening to Mozart in a concert hall and the experience of listening 
to the same piece when the air-conditioning breaks down: the auditory characters 
of both experiences are the same even though their global characters are different.  
 
Diagram G 
Exp 1 Exp 2 
T 1 T 3 T 4 T 5 Time  T 2 
Exp 3 Exp 4  
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[Refer to Diagram G] To claim that experiences have global character is 
to claim that experiences are holistic. In diagram G, Exp 2 would have a different 
global character if Exp 3 had not existed, even though it would have the same 
local character. Given that the identity of experiences is defined by a combination 
of both local and global character, Exp 2 would have been replaced by a different 
experience if Exp 3 had not occurred. Thus if our experiences are holistic over 
time, then Exp 2 could not have occurred except when followed by Exp 3 or 
experiences similar to Exp 3.  
There seems to be some sort of backward causation at work given that Exp 
3 occurs later in time and yet is able to affect Exp 2. Dainton himself is aware of 
this seeming absurdity. He only notes briefly, however, that “… like all mid-
stream experiences, (Exp 2) is Janus-faced, being co-conscious with both earlier 
and later experiences. Once this is recognized, the situation no longer seems 
peculiar or problematic; it is simply an inevitable consequence of the fact that 
distinct total experiences overlap.” (Dainton 2006 p.230) 
Dainton’s account is indeed highly questionable if it posits that our 
experiences regularly involve backward causation. However, we need not think 
that this kind of backward-looking phenomenal holism requires backward 
causation to work. In Consciousness explained, Daniel Dennett discusses a 
phenomenon present in our experiences called the phi phenomenon which appears 
to be an example of such a backward-looking phenomenal holism. 18  Dennett 
reported the findings of some psychologists as follows, “If two or more small 
spots separated by as much as 4 degrees of visual angle are briefly lit in rapid 
                                               
18 See Dennett 1991. 
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succession, a single spot will seem to move back and forth.” (Dennett 1991, p. 
114)  It was further discovered that if the two spots are of different colors, the first 
spot will seem to move towards the second spot, then change color suddenly in 
the middle of its passage towards the second spot.  
The psychologists were puzzled by the color change in the phi 
phenomenon (call it the color phi phenomenon): how does the moving spot know 
what color to change to if the subject has yet to experience the second (stationary) 
spot? There is no doubt that the color of the second spot plays a part in 
determining what color the moving spot will change to, but barring precognition, 
it must seem that some kind of backward causation is at work.  
There are, however, other explanations that are less extravagant than either 
precognition or backward causation. Dennett discusses two possible explanations, 
one which he calls the Orwellian hypothesis and the other the Stalinesque 
hypothesis. 
Let us suppose that the first spot is red in color, and the second spot green. 
In the Orwellian hypothesis, we first experience the red spot then the green spot 
then we experience a revision in memory which consists of a false memory of a 
red spot moving and changing to green mid-way. So in reality, we never did 
experience a red spot moving and changing color mid-way. What we do 
experience are merely the two stationary spots plus the (false) memory of having 
seen a moving red-turning-to-green spot. And according to the Orwellian 
hypothesis, this revision in memory happens very quickly—so fast that before you 
can form a verbal report of the two stationary spots, your memory is already 
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contaminated. Naturally, since your memory is already contaminated, your very 
first verbal report of seeing the two spots is contaminated—you report, falsely, 
that you have seen first the red spot, then the moving spot which changed color, 
then the green spot.  
In the Stalinesque hypothesis, there is a time delay to all experiences that 
we have. The brain first receives the information of the red spot and the green 
spot, but before the information becomes conscious, the brain splices some newly 
created experiential frames in—the experience of a moving red spot changing into 
green midway. This is much like how the editing rooms of “live” broadcast screen 
their programs: the images from a game is transmitted to the editing room, where 
editors, working as fast as they can, censor any obscenities and splice in 
advertisements. The edited game is then broadcast over the television network 
with only a slight delay in time. In the brain, the images of a moving red-turning-
into-green spot are spliced in between the image of the red spot and the image of 
the green spot before all the images are made conscious. The subject then reports, 
truly, that he experiences first the stationary red spot, then the moving red-
turning-into-green spot, and lastly the stationary green spot.  
The main difference between the Orwellian hypothesis and the Stalinesque 
hypothesis is that in the latter, the subject is right about his experiences: he really 
did have the three experiences in the reported order. In the Orwellian hypothesis, 
the subject did not experience the moving red-turning-into-green spot, but he was 
led to believe that he did, purely due to the revisions to his memories. 
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It may seem that empirical findings would easily disprove one hypothesis 
in favor of the other, but surprisingly, both hypotheses have resisted being ruled 
out in this way. 19  My aim in this paper is not to argue for either of these 
hypotheses, but to show that backward-looking holism does not necessarily 
involve backward causation—there are more plausible explanations such as the 
Orwellian hypothesis or the Stalinesque hypothesis which can account for such 
phenomena. If so, then the seemingly strong holism that Dainton attributes to our 
experiences does not seem that absurd after all.  
 
First reason to think that holism is incompatible with fission 
 
Diagram H 
If all our experiences are holistic as described, then there seems to be two 
reasons to believe that fission cannot take place. We will talk about the first 
reason in this section. Refer to diagram H. At time T1 to T3, an experience Exp 2 
supposedly flows into two separate and distinct experiences Exp 3 and 3’. If our 
experiences are holistic over time as Dainton describes, then the intrinsic 
                                               
19 For an in-depth discussion of the two hypotheses, see Dennett 1991 (pg. 101-138). 
Exp 1 Exp 2 
Exp 4’ Exp 3’ 
T 0 T 2 T 3 T 4 
Time  
T 1 
Exp 3 Exp 4  
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phenomenal character of Exp 2 will affect the intrinsic character of both Exp 3 
and 3’.  
At the same time however, the intrinsic phenomenal character of Exp 2 is 
also affected by the intrinsic phenomenal character of Exp 3. If the intrinsic 
character of Exp 2 is affected by the intrinsic character of Exp 3, then the intrinsic 
character of Exp 3’ must also be affected by the intrinsic character of Exp 3, since 
Exp 2 affects Exp 3’. Similarly, Exp 3 must be affected in the same way by Exp 
3’. Thus according to Dainton’s version of phenomenal holism, Exp 3 could not 
have occurred except when occurring together with an experience similar to, or 
identical with, Exp 3’.  
If our experiences are holistic in the manner that Dainton describes, then 
the first experience in either of the post-fission stream of consciousness cannot 
occur except as together with the first experience of the other post-fission stream 
of consciousness. However, if two selves are expected to emerge from the surgery, 
it does not seem plausible to think that their experiences are dependent on each 
other’s experiences in such an intimate manner. In order for fission to have taken 
place, there should be two resulting streams of consciousness. If Exp 3 and Exp 3’ 
are related in such a manner, however, it is not clear if there are one or two 
resulting streams of consciousness after all.  
Moreover, if Exp 3 could not have occurred except when occurring 
together with Exp 3’, and if Exp 3 and Exp 3’ affect each other intrinsically, it 
seems that we have a good reason to think that they are directly co-conscious after 
all. If the two experiences are directly co-conscious with each other, then we have 
 57 
just one post-procedural stream of consciousness—again, no fission would have 
taken place.  
 
A second reason for the incompatibility of holism and fission 
 
If our experiences are holistic as described, we will get some very 
paradoxical results if fission is possible. Suppose that before the fission procedure, 
the subject is exposed to a buzz of a certain volume, and Exp 2 is the experience 
as of hearing this buzz. If the fission procedure produces two new selves in the 
same environment, we can expect the phenomenal character of Exp 3 to be quite 
similar to the phenomenal character of Exp 3’. However, it is possible for one of 
the selves to be produced in a room in which there is a buzz lower in volume than 
the original buzz, while the other self is produced in another room where there is a 
buzz higher in volume than the original buzz. (Here, I will assume that the 
surgeries are instantaneous. Thus the brain removal and the brain transplant all 
happen within an instant. This is to allow the subject(s) involved to have sensory 
perceptions immediately following the supposed point of fission.) 
Given Dainton’s account, where earlier experiences and later experiences 
form holistic experiential wholes, the self at the point of fission seems to be in a 
paradoxical situation: she would have an experience as of hearing a buzz which 
increases and decreases in volume at the same time. From the perspective of the 
post-fission selves, there is not much of a problem: each of them merely 
experiences a buzz which became louder or softer, respectively. But from the 
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perspective of the pre-fission self, it is not possible that she has the experience of a 
buzz which appears to progressively increase and decrease in volume at the same 
time. Yet if Dainton is right, and Exp 2 is co-conscious with both Exp 3 and 3’, 
then Exp 2, Exp 3 and Exp 3’ will form a holistic unity. The pre-fission self will 
experience the volume of the buzz to be increasing and decreasing at the same 
time.  
Or suppose that the pre-fission self experiences a pain of a certain degree 
in her left thigh. After the fission procedure, one of the resulting selves 
experiences a pain in her left thigh to a lower degree, while the other self 
experiences a pain in her left thigh to a higher degree. Again, the pre-fission self 
seems to be in a paradoxical situation: at the point of fission, she will experience a 
pain which is alleviating and intensifying at the same time.  
We can put the same point in another way. From the perspective of one of 
the post-fission selves, all she has is an experience as of a pain which alleviates 
over time. This means that she is phenomenally continuous with a pre-fission self 
who has the experience as of a pain alleviating. For the other post-fission self, she 
has an experience as of a pain which intensifies over time, which means that she 
is phenomenally continuous with a pre-fission self who has the experience as of a 
pain intensifying. If so, then the two post-fission selves cannot have the same pre-
fission self, for their pre-fission selves have contrary experiences. This means that 




The incompatibility is only apparent 
 
 Earlier on I mentioned that Dainton’s version of phenomenal holism might 
appear to be absurdly strong since it seems to involve backward causation. I also 
suggested two hypotheses (developed by Dennett) to explain this kind of 
backward-looking holism without invoking backward causation and pre-
cognition—the Stalinesque hypothesis and the Orwellian hypothesis. However, it 
turns out that if Dainton subscribes to either of the two hypotheses to explain the 
backward-looking holism in his account, then his version of phenomenal holism 
seems to be compatible with the possibility of fission after all. 
First, the Orwellian hypothesis. Recall that the color change of the moving 
spot in the color phi phenomenon is explained by revisions of memory by the 
subject after she experienced the second stationary spot. That is to say, the subject 
first experiences the red spot then the green spot then she experiences a revision 
in memory which consists of a false memory of a red spot moving and changing 
to green mid-way. According to the Orwellian hypothesis, this means that at the 
point of surgery the self would not experience any backward looking unity 
between the last experience in the pre-surgery stream of consciousness and the 
first experience in the post-surgery stream of consciousness. It is only after she 
has experienced the first post-surgery experience that she revises her memory 
accordingly. 
Now, if both transplant surgeries are successful, then even if each brain-
half (each in a different body) has a different experience, there will be no 
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absurdity involved since the pre-surgery self does not have any contradictory 
experiences at the point of surgery. The pre-surgery self does not have, to borrow 
the discussion in the immediately preceding section, an experience as of a pain 
intensifying and alleviating at the same time at the point of surgery. At the point 
of surgery, the pre-surgery self has yet to experience the greater degree of pain 
that one of the post-surgery self will feel, nor the lesser degree of pain that the 
other post-surgery self will feel. It is only after the point of surgery, that the 
revisions in memory take place. Each post-surgery self will have a different 
memory of the surgery. One has the memory of her pain alleviating over time, 
while the other has the memory of her pain lessening over time. But neither the 
pre-surgery self nor the post-surgery selves have the contradictory experience of a 
pain alleviating and lessening at the same time. 
 In the Stalinesque hypothesis, there is a time delay to all experiences that 
we have. For the color phi phenomenon, the brain first receives the (physical and 
non-experiential) information of the red spot and the green spot, but before the 
information becomes conscious, the brain splices some newly created experiential 
frames in—the experience of a moving red spot changing into green midway. 
According to the Stalinesque hypothesis then, at the point of surgery, the self will 
receive sensory (physical but non-experiential) information of the surgery, but 
will not have any conscious experience of the surgery yet. It is only after the brain 
halves are successfully transplanted, and after the post-surgery selves has the first 
post-surgery experience, then the brain halves will splice in some newly created 
experiential frames in between the pre-surgery experience and the post-surgery 
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experience. And again, it seems that at no point of time will there be a self who 
has the contradictory experience as of a pain alleviating and lessening at the same 
time. This is because the newly created experiential frames of the surgery are only 
available to the post-surgery selves after a time delay from the surgery. One will 
have the experience as of her pain alleviating over time, while the other has the 
experience as of her pain lessening over time. Due to the time delay postulated in 
the Stalinesque hypothesis, the pre-surgery self would not have the experience as 
of undergoing surgery at the instant of surgery itself. 
 In general, any hypothesis that can explain backward-looking phenomenal 
holism, and which does not make use of backward causation or precognition, 
would render Dainton’s version of phenomenal holism compatible with the 
possibility of fission. This is because if we bar backward causation or 
precognition, there is no way that the subject can experience, at the point of 
surgery, any holistic effects from the post-surgery experiences. The subject can 
experience those effects with a time delay (as in the Stalinesque hypothesis) after 
the surgery, or she does not experience any such holistic effects at all, but instead 
has her memory of the surgery revised (as in the Orwellian hypothesis). In any 
possible hypothesis explaining backward-looking phenomenal holism, the pre-
surgery self will not have any contradictory experiences, while the post-surgery 
selves might have different, even contrary experiences. But this is entirely 
compatible with the possibility of fission. Thus, even though the phenomenal 
holism of Dainton’s account is outwardly incompatible with the possibility of 
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fission, it turns out to be otherwise once we explain the mechanisms behind 
backward-looking holism. 
  
The Nature of Co-consciousness 
 
I will argue that there is still one feature of Dainton’s account that is 
incompatible with the possibility of fission. If experiences are interrelated by the 
co-consciousness relationship as described by Dainton’s account, then streams of 
consciousness would be unable to split up, because simultaneous experiences will 
always be unified if they are diachronically co-conscious with a single experience. 
 
Diagram H 
Let us look at what happens at the supposed point of fission again 
(Diagram H). A single experience Exp 2 is co-conscious with two other 
experiences Exp 3 and Exp 3’. In order for the procedure to count as fission, each 
of the two resulting streams of consciousness must constitute a distinct self. This 
means that the two resulting streams of consciousness must not be directly co-
conscious with each other (presumably, the two streams of consciousness will 
Exp 1 Exp 2 
Exp 4’ Exp 3’ 
T 0 T 2 T 3 T 4 
Time  
T 1 
Exp 3 Exp 4  
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always be indirectly co-conscious with each other because they share a common 
past). This I have argued for in Chapter 3: the two resulting streams of 
consciousness cannot be directly co-conscious with each other, or they will risk 
becoming a single stream of consciousness.  
If the two streams of consciousness cannot be directly co-conscious with 
each other, then Exp 3 and Exp 3’ cannot be directly co-conscious with each other. 
However, given what we know of Dainton’s account of co-consciousness, this 
does not seem possible. According to Dainton, experiences which are co-
conscious with each other are “fused” together. Dainton describes the relationship 
of co-consciousness as follows: 
When an experience e1 is co-conscious with a simultaneous experience e2, 
these two experiences are in effect fused into a single unit of experience, 
each part of which is co-conscious with every other part… In a manner of 
speaking, the two are wholly joined, there is no ‘distance’ separating them 
at all. Since e1 and e2 are parts of a single experience in this way, how 
could it be possible for another experience e3 to be co-conscious with e2 
without also being co-conscious with e1? Given that e1 and e2 are fused, 
any experience that is co-conscious with e2 will automatically and 
necessarily be co-conscious with e1 as well. (Dainton 2006 p. 105) 
The language is a little metaphorical, but the implications are clear: when 
one experience is co-conscious with another experience, a third experience which 
is co-conscious with the first cannot fail to be co-conscious with the second. If 
that is so, then Exp 2 and Exp 3 together form a single experiential unit, and it is 
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not possible that this single experiential unit is co-conscious with Exp 3’ without 
Exp 3 being directly co-conscious with Exp 3’. Thus Exp 3 cannot fail to be 
directly co-conscious with Exp 3’.  
Dainton is talking about the relationship of co-consciousness between 
simultaneous experiences, and it seems that it should hold between diachronic 
experiences as well. However, it must be noted that there are some important 
differences between the synchronic case and the diachronic case. For three 
temporally successive experiences which are diachronically co-conscious with 
each other, the fact that the first experience is directly co-conscious with the 
second, and the second is directly co-conscious with the third, does not 
necessarily mean that the first is directly co-conscious with the third. In fact, if the 
first experience is separated from the third by the duration of a diachronic total 
experience, then the first experience will not be directly co-conscious with the 
third.  
That is to say, in the normal diachronic case (referring to Diagram G), by 
the time Exp 3 occurs, Exp 1 would have been too far in the past for the two 
experiences to be directly co-conscious with each other. Thus it is no surprise that 
even though Exp 3 is directly co-conscious with Exp 2, and Exp 2 is directly co-
conscious with Exp 1, nonetheless Exp 3 is not directly co-conscious with Exp 1.  
It might seem that the difference between diachronic co-consciousness and 
synchronic co-consciousness is significant enough to deny that Exp 3 is directly 
co-conscious with Exp 3’. However, the case of normal diachronic experience we 
are asked to consider is importantly different from the case of fission. In the 
 65 
normal diachronic case, the first experience needs to be separated from the third 
experience by at least a certain duration in order for them not to be directly co-
conscious with each other. In the case of fission, we are asked imagine a scenario 
where Exp 2 is directly co-conscious with both Exp 3 and Exp 3’, where Exp 3 
and Exp 3’ are simultaneous, and yet the two experiences are not directly co-
conscious with each other. If Exp 3, Exp 2, and Exp 3’ are lined up successively 
in that order, it is reasonable to think that Exp 3 and Exp 3’ might not be directly 
co-conscious with each other. But imagination fails us when we are to suppose 
that two simultaneous experiences which are directly co-conscious with a single 
experience are not directly co-conscious with each other. If we think in terms of 
the metaphors that Dainton employs, the later parts of Exp 2 are fused into a 
single unit of experience with the earlier parts of Exp 3. At the same time, the 
same parts of Exp 2 are fused into a single unit of experience with the earlier 
parts of Exp 3’. Given that, it seems inconceivable how Exp 3 and Exp 3’ can fail 
to be directly co-conscious with each other.  
The upshot of this section is that Exp 3 and Exp 3’ cannot fail to be 
directly co-conscious with each other given Dainton’s account. Notice that this 
argument applies to all subsequent experiences later than Exp 3 and Exp 3’. If 
Exp 3 and Exp 3’ are directly co-conscious with each other, as I have argued, then 
Exp 4 and Exp 4’ cannot fail to be directly co-conscious with each other as well, 
because they are both directly co-conscious with a single experience (Exp 3 + 3’). 
Thus if the experiences at the point of fission cannot fail to be directly co-




 Why couldn’t Dainton, for example, deny that the later parts of Exp 2 are 
fused into a single unit of experience with the earlier parts of both Exp 3 and Exp 
3’? Previously, I mentioned that Dainton is talking about the relationship of co-
consciousness between simultaneous experiences when he said that “(when) an 
experience e1 is co-conscious with a simultaneous experience e2, these two 
experiences are in effect fused into a single unit of experience…” I then 
extrapolated the characterization of the synchronic co-consciousness relationship 
to the case of diachronic co-consciousness. Perhaps that is an invalid 
extrapolation. Could Dainton have intended the relationship of synchronic co-
consciousness to be significantly different from the relationship of diachronic co-
consciousness in this respect?  
The problem with this objection is that Dainton explicitly avows that the 
diachronic co-consciousness relationship is the same as the synchronic co-
consciousness relationship. Dainton writes of the diachronic co-consciousness 
relationship as follows: 
My aim is to establish that the diachronic unity of experience is no 
different, in essentials, from the synchronic: both are the product of co-
consciousness. Just as simultaneous experiences… can be experienced 
together, so can successive experiences, experiences occurring at different 
(but not distant) times. (Dainton 2006, p. 113) 
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Beyond that, he makes no attempt to characterize the diachronic unity of 
experiences differently from the synchronic unity of experiences. But could 
Dainton have said something more? It is not clear what he can. If the successive 
experiences are not unified in such a way that they form a larger experience, then 
we need to know how else they can be unified. If being unified simply means that 
the successive experiences belong to the same stream of consciousness, then it is 
question begging. Or suppose Dainton thinks that successive experiences are 
unified if the earlier experiences flow into the later ones, then we need to know 
what this “flow” amounts to, if it is actually different from the “fusing” kind of 
unity previously mentioned. And since the co-conscious relationship is a primitive 
one, it cannot be reduced to a causal relationship either.  
It is not clear what other characterization Dainton can give of the 
diachronic co-consciousness relationship. Thus, it seems safe to say that the 
characterization of synchronic co-consciousness is analogous to the 
characterization of diachronic co-coconsciousness, and that diachronic co-
consciousness is not compatible with the possibility of fission given the way it is 
characterized. 
 
What happens to the original person after the surgery 
 
Thus far, I have argued that a stream of consciousness cannot be 
phenomenally continuous with two later streams of consciousness at the same 
time. The question now is: does the original self survive the brain transplant 
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surgery (in which both halves of her brain are removed and transplanted into 
different bodies)? If we recall the discussion in Chapter 3, there are only three 
options to take with regards to the survival of the original self (we will ignore 
option 4, since option 4 actually involves two original selves, which is contrary to 
stipulation): 1. the self does not survive; 2. the self survives as only one of the 
post-surgery selves; 3. the self survives as both post-surgery selves.  
Since I have argued that it is not possible for a single stream of 
consciousness to be phenomenally continuous with two later streams of 
consciousness at the same time, only the first two options are left—the original 
self must not have survived the surgery or she must have survived as only one of 
the two selves. I suggest that the second option is the correct one.  
To reiterate what I have argued in Chapter 3, if we think that patients can 
survive surgeries in which half of their (usually diseased) brains are removed, 
then it does not seem reasonable to think that the original self would not survive 
this surgery (in which half of his brain is removed and transplanted). The 
difference between a real-life hemispherectomy surgery and the (fictitious) brain 
transplant surgery is that in the former, the half of the brain that is removed is not 
being transplanted into another body. But surely what we do with the removed 
half of the brain has no bearings on whether the original self survives with half of 
his brain left. Thus it is not reasonable to think that the original self does not 
survive at all.  
In chapter 3, I suggested that it is arbitrary to think that the self survives as 
only one of the two post-surgery selves when both transplants are counted 
 69 
successful. This response may be slightly too quick. Imagine the case of a plank 
of wood floating down a river stream which branches out into two distributaries. 
When the plank of wood reaches the branching point, which distributary it will 
float into is probably arbitrary, but being arbitrary does not mean that it would 
float into both distributaries. If we think that streams of consciousness, like the 
path of the floating plank, cannot take a branching form, then the original self 
must survive as only one of the two selves.  
I have also said that both transplants are counted successful, but this 
assessment is too vague. A brain transplant surgery may be counted a success or a 
failure depending on the criteria we adopt. Suppose that after the transplant 
surgeries (as in the original case description given in Chapter 3), the two bodies 
are able to function relatively well, and each body is able to report on her 
experiences. If a surgery is successful just because the patients involved are able 
to function properly and are able to have experiences after the surgery, then the 
brain transplant surgeries are clearly successful. But a successful surgery in this 
sense does not entail that the original self survives as two selves. In order for the 
original self to survive as the two post-surgery selves, not only do the two post-
surgery selves have to retain the ability to have experiences, they must also be 
phenomenally continuous with the original self (if Dainton’s Simple Concept 
account is correct). Yet it is possible that the post-surgery selves retain the ability 
to have experiences and still not be phenomenally continuous with the original 
self. Given that it is impossible for phenomenal continuity to take a branching 
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form, the original self must have been phenomenally continuous with at most one 
post-surgery selves, even if both surgeries are deemed to be successful. 
Thus when a self undergoes a brain transplant surgery, she will survive as 
only one of the two resulting selves. We may never know which self she actually 
survives as, but we can be sure that she does not survive as both. Both resulting 
selves may even insist that they were the original self. But the fact that 
phenomenal continuity is a non-branching relationship casts doubts on the validity 
of their claims: at least one of them must have been deluded into thinking that he 





Inconceivability of fission from the first-person perspective 
 
I will argue in this section that we cannot conceive of fission from a first 
person viewpoint. That is to say, even if it is possible to imagine other selves 
undergoing fission, it is impossible for us to imagine ourselves doing so. Note that 
I am not arguing here that fission is impossible. Rather, I am arguing that fission 
is implausible—being unable to imagine ourselves undergoing fission does not 
make fission impossible because there may be things that are beyond human’s 
imagination, but being inconceivable does point to the fact that it may be 
impossible. 
Imagine it is the post-war era. The government desperately needs 
professionals to help the economy survive. Most of the professionals in the nation 
however have died in the war. You, a famous neuroscientist, are fatally wounded, 
but still alive, if barely. The government decides to harvest your brain, split it into 
the left and right half, and transplant them into two separate bodies, both cloned 
from your DNA. A friend is at the hospital as an observer.  
From your friend’s perspective, you are wheeled into the surgery room, 
and hours later, two humans step out of the room, both looking and behaving 
exactly like the original you. To your friend, there are a few possibilities.  
Possibility One: Both of the humans are not you. The original you have 
died in the process and two similar looking humans have taken your place.  
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Possibility Two: You are one of the two. The other human looks exactly 
like you, but is not actually you.  
Possibility Three: Both humans are you.  
Possibility Four: There were two selves from the start; in reality, two 
selves have co-existed in a single body all along, and both have always 
acted in such perfect unison that no one, including themselves, suspected 
there were two selves. The surgery spatially separates these two distinct 
selves.  
If your friend is well versed with the relevant philosophical literature, he 
would know that possibilities One, Two, and Four are not fission. This I have 
shown in chapter 3. He might want to call them Death, Cloning, and Separation 
respectively. For the observer, it will only be a case of fission if he can imagine 
both humans to be a continuation of the pre-surgery human; in other words, 
possibility Three.  
Things are very different from a first-person perspective when we try to 
imagine the scenario “from the inside”. First, I am told that I will undergo a 
surgery to split my brain into the left hemisphere and the right hemisphere, and 
following which, each hemisphere will be transplanted. Then I watch helplessly 
as the surgeon reaches into my skull… 
Here are some possible scenarios of what I will experience next: (1) I feel 
myself slowly fading away. First all the sensory inputs disappear, but this is only 
to be expected while the brain is being transplanted. Then, to my horror, even my 
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thoughts and emotions slowly fade away. None of my experiences at the last 
moment is unified or continuous with any later experiences.  
We seem to know intuitively what it is like to have experiences which are 
unified or continuous with other experiences—it is harder to put in words what 
this continuity of experiences is like. It is probably accurate to say that we have 
only had experiences which are continuously flowing into other experiences. This 
could account for why we find it so hard to describe, apart from using metaphors 
and synonyms, what this continuity of experiences is. However, we do know what 
an absence of experiential continuity is like: we do not feel our experiences 
continuing into other people’s experiences. If someone were to tell me that he is 
experiencing some acute pain right now, it would be immediately obvious to me if 
my current experiences are continuous with his pain experience. In the surgery 
scenario described above, if it is obvious to me that my experiences are not 
continuous with the experiences of either of the post-surgery beings, then I do not 
survive as either of them. As far as I am concerned, this kind of procedure is 
actually fatal. 
Scenario (2): All my sensory inputs disappear. Being a neuroscientist 
myself, I muse about what would happen after both halves of my brain are 
transplanted separately. Gradually, my vision is being restored. Other than being 
unusually weak, I feel pretty much the same as before. To my right, another 
person looking identical to me is sitting up, examining himself much like what I 
am doing. 
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For this case, I did not imagine my pre-surgery experiences being unified 
with two later selves; all I did was imagining my pre-surgery experiences being 
unified with the experiences of one post-surgery self. If I did not imagine my pre-
surgery experiences being unified with two later selves at the same time, then I 
did not imagine myself surviving as two selves. To imagine the above scenario is 
merely to imagine myself undergoing cloning, not fission. Scenario (1) and (2) 
correspond to the possibilities One and Two respectively from the third person 
perspective; neither of them describes a case of imagining fission from the inside. 
There might be an objection at this point: scenario (2) seems to be unfairly 
described as Cloning. While I, as one of the post-surgery selves, feel myself 
continuing from the pre-surgery stream of consciousness, and experience nothing 
of what the other post-surgery self does, this does not rule out the possibility that 
the other self is in the same situation as I am. If the other self feels himself 
continuing from the pre-surgery stream of consciousness in the same way that I 
do, then it seems that both of us have as much claim to being a continuation of the 
pre-surgery self. If that is so, then we have a genuine case of fission, where one 
stream of consciousness flows into two distinct and separate streams at the same 
time.  
On first sight, this seems to be a promising line of argument. As distinct 
and separate selves, neither of the post-fission entities is supposed to share each 
other’s experiences, nor are the experiences of one supposed to flow into the 
experiences of the other. It seems natural then that neither of us experiences 
ourselves continuing or surviving as the other.  
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However, this objection misses the point. It fails to consider the point of 
view of the pre-surgery self. Granted that we can imagine the case from the inside 
as either of the post-surgery selves continuing from a single stream of 
consciousness (though not both at the same time), nonetheless, we cannot imagine 
ourselves as the pre-surgery self continuing into two separate streams of 
consciousness at the same time. To conceive of fission from the first person 
perspective is not to imagine one post-fission self’s experiences flowing into the 
other post-fission self’s experiences, but to imagine the pre-fission self’s 
experiences flowing into both post-fission selves’ experiences at the same time. 
Try as we might, it seems that we simply cannot imagine our experiences doing 
so.  
If we cannot conceive of such a situation from the pre-surgery self’s 
perspective, then we have failed to imagine ourselves undergoing fission. And 
insofar as we cannot imagine ourselves doing so, the post-surgery selves’ claims 
are dubious: at least one of the post-surgery selves must have been deluded in 
thinking that his experiences continue from the original stream of consciousness.  
A scenario that corresponds to possibility Four from the third-person 
perspective is similar, in spirit at least, to scenario (2). I will see a self identical to 
me after the surgery, but that self is not a continuation of the original me. This 
other self has been sharing the same body with me all along before the time of 
surgery: perhaps he is the left brain while I am the right brain. In this case, the 
“me” that is being referred to, both before and after the surgery, is actually the 
self who is realised by only the right half of the brain. The difference between this 
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scenario and fission is precisely the fact that the other self who emerges from the 
surgery does not continue from the original me. For fission to have taken place, 
the two post-surgery selves must continue from a single self. Thus, if there were 
two selves all along sharing the same body, then even though they are physically 
separated by the surgery, it is not a case of personal fission. 
In order for us to truly imagine fission “from the inside”, we have to be 
able to imagine our experiences flowing into two separate and distinct streams of 
consciousness. Prima facie, it might seem that we can do that if we imagine our 
vision gradually dividing. Those who can make themselves go cross-eyed are 
probably able to imagine this scenario with ease.  
However, this is not a case of imagining fission “from the inside”. Even 
after such a procedure where my field of vision divides, I am not two selves—I 
am merely one self “housed” in two separate bodies. I am now able to view the 
world through two sets of eyes, manipulate objects with two sets of hands, etc., 
but I am just a single self. There is fission of my physical body, but nonetheless, I 
did not survive as two selves—i.e. personal fission did not take place.  
It seems that for us to imagine ourselves undergoing fission, we must be 
able to imagine ourselves becoming two distinct and independent selves. 
However, in order for us to imagine ourselves becoming two distinct and 
independent selves, we must be able to, at one point of time, imagine being two 
distinct and independent selves. And this seems to be plainly impossible.  
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Objection from unconsciousness 
 
One might wonder if we would be able to imagine fission from the first 
person perspective if we imagine ourselves to be unconscious throughout the 
surgery. It might seem that trying to do so poses no problem at all—I simply wake 
up after the surgery to the fact that I have undergone fission, without the hassle of 
me experiencing the process at all.  
However, it is important to note what we are actually imagining in such a 
scenario. If someone were to remove half of my brain and transplant it into 
another body while I am in deep sleep, and assuming that both surgeries (the brain 
removal surgery and the brain transplant surgery) are successful, I would not 
wake up thinking that I am two selves now. This is because if fission did occur, 
then the original self would have survived as two numerically distinct and 
independent selves, and each post-fission self would wake up thinking that she is 
the original self—she would not think that she is two selves now. On the other 
hand, if fission did not occur, then there will just be (at most) one self after the 
surgery: either the original self survives as only one self, or she did not survive at 
all. 
Thus, if I imagined myself to be unconscious during the surgery, then I 
would not have imagined fission from a first person perspective. This is because 
to imagine fission from a first person perspective involves imagining me 
becoming two selves at the same time. Clearly, for the reasons stated above, being 
 78 
unconscious during the surgery would prevent me from experiencing the process 
of becoming two selves.  
The problem with imagining an unconscious subject undergoing fission is 
that there is simply no first person perspective when the subject is unconscious. If 
we were to imagine ourselves being unconscious throughout the surgery, we 
would not have imagined ourselves becoming two selves—we would merely have 
imagined ourselves waking up to other people telling us that we have just 
undergone fission—and this is not the same thing as imagining ourselves 
undergoing fission. There is no problem with us imagining ourselves before and 
after fission, but because we are unconscious during the point of fission, we did 




I suggest that the reason why we are unable to imagine ourselves 
undergoing fission is because we cannot imagine us as one person becoming two. 
The gist of my arguments thus far is that we are not able to imagine fission from a 
first person perspective. Admittedly, the failure of imagination from the first 
person perspective does not entail that fission itself is impossible. There may be 
things that are beyond human’s imagination, yet are logically possible. Whether 
inconceivability entails impossibility depends on whether the failure of 
imagination is due to our limits of imagination, or due to a contradiction in the 
idea.  
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to argue that the inconceivability of 
fission from a first person perspective implies that there is a hidden contradiction 
in the idea of fission. Suffice to note that the fact that we are unable to do so casts 
doubts on the plausibility of fission. First-person inconceivability of fission forces 
us to reconsider whether we want to simply assume that fission is un-
controversially possible.  
Since all that I am arguing is that we are unable to imagine ourselves 
undergoing fission, the possibility of fission occurring while the subject is 
unconscious does not undermine my arguments at all. However, it does highlight 
the fact that we cannot rule out fission a priori simply because we cannot 
conceive of it from a first person perspective—fission might still be possible if the 
subject is unconscious.  
That said, the burden of proof seems to lies on the advocates of fission to 
show why fission procedures must systematically take place only when the 
subjects are unconscious. Until a non ad hoc reason can be given, the fact that 








Imagine that you are walking down a street one day when you accidentally 
stub your toe. As you cry out in pain, you hear a twin echo from a man nearby. 
Like you, he is half bent over, holding one of his feet and hopping around on the 
other, acting exactly like he has stubbed his toe at the same moment. You feel a 
pang of empathy for him—you know exactly how he feels. But the empathy soon 
turns to surprise, when the man suddenly turns to you and exclaims, “Hey watch it! 
My toe hurts when you do that!”  
Even if you do believe that his toe hurts when you stub your toe, it seems 
that all that you need to be committed to believing is that stubbing your toe causes 
him to experience a pain. Stubbing your toe should not cause him to experience 
your pain. We seem to have the intuition that no two persons can share a single 
experiential state. In fact, it is hard to make sense of the idea that two persons can 
share a single experiential state.  
Regardless how similar your experiences are to mine, it seems that my 
experiences are mine and only mine. Experiences that belong to other subjects are 
at the best qualitatively similar to my experiences, but they can never be 
numerically identical to them. At least, this is what our pre-philosophical 
reflections tell us. 
However, if Dainton is right, then there will be some degree of 
phenomenal state sharing between subjects. Recall that fission is defined as a 
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single stream of consciousness being phenomenally continuous with two later 
streams of consciousness at the same time. (Refer to Diagram H again.) Let us 
assume that Exp 2 is the experience at the point of fission. Exp 2 is diachronically 
co-conscious with both Exp 3 and Exp 3’. This has to be true if the two resulting 
streams of consciousness are continuous with the original stream of consciousness; 
if Exp 2 and Exp 3 are not directly co-conscious, then they cannot belong to the 
same stream of consciousness. By similar reasoning, Exp 2 and Exp 3’ are also 
directly co-conscious. At the point of fission then, both post-fission selves 
together share a single experience—Exp 2.  
Thus, if fission is possible, then there will be phenomenal state sharing—
the two resulting selves will have to share a single experience, Exp 2. I suggest 
that this is a consequence that should be avoided. If phenomenal state sharing is 
possible, then experiences would no longer be uniquely “owned”. Pain, and any 
other experiential states, would no longer hold the special status of being only and 
necessarily mine. While this does not have any obvious practical implications, it 
does violate certain common intuitions. If you stub your toe, and someone beside 
you exhibits the exact same pain-behavior at the same time, you would not think 
that he is feeling your pain. At most, you think that he is feeling a pain which is 
qualitatively identical to yours or a pain which is caused by your toe-stubbing.  
There will be some who think that if fission is possible, then phenomenal 
state sharing would no longer be strange. Phenomenal state sharing is only strange 
because we are thinking of humans as non-branching entities. If the streams of 
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consciousness can split up like amoebas, then we should come to expect that 
human beings can share phenomenal states as well. 
However, if we have independent grounds for believing that fission is 
implausible, then instead of accepting two absurdities—fission and phenomenal 
state sharing—we would do better to deny both at the same time. And it is 
obvious from the discussion in the previous chapter that we do have independent 
reasons for believing that fission is implausible. 
So much literature has grown around the topic of fission that it is almost 
forgotten how counter-intuitive personal fission is. It is not supposed to be an 
advantage of an account of personal identity to be able to account for fission. 
Most psychological continuity accounts try to make fission palatable, owing to the 
fact that their accounts appear to be committed to the possibility of fission. 
According to psychological continuity accounts, a self survives over time as 
another self if and only if the psychological states of the earlier self are causally 
related in an appropriate way to the psychological states of the later self. 
Objectors to the psychological continuity accounts then point out that it is 
possible for an earlier self to be so related to two distinct selves which exist at the 
same time. In other words, the psychological continuity accounts seem to be 
committed to the possibility of fission.  
However, fission does not seem to be an easy bullet to bite, given how 
hard it is to make sense of a single self becoming two simultaneously existing 
selves. If what I have argued in the previous chapter is correct, fission is 
inconceivable from a first person perspective. Since fission appears to be 
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conceptually doubtful, we should avoid commitment to it as far as possible. 
Insofar as psychological continuity accounts imply that fission is possible, we 
have one less reason to believe in them.  
In the previous chapters, I have argued that Dainton’s account is 
incompatible with the possibility of fission. This means that under Dainton’s 
account, it is not possible for a person to be phenomenally continuous with two or 
more selves at the same time. If what I have argued thus far is correct, then it is an 
advantage of Dainton’s account that it is incompatible with the possibility of 
fission. Therefore if all things are equal, we ought to favor Dainton’s account over 
psychological continuity accounts and other personal identity accounts that are 
compatible with the possibility of fission. 
In this paper, I have argued for two things: firstly, Dainton’s Simple 
Conception account is not compatible with the possibility of fission, and secondly, 
fission is not as plausible as commonly made out to be. The two conclusions 
together imply that Dainton’s account is not without its merits, and should be 
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